Dynamic R&D networks by König, Michael D
  
 
 
 
Working Paper No. 109 
 
 
Dynamic R&D Networks 
 
 
 
 
Michael D. König 
 
 
 
January 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
University of Zurich 
 
Department of Economics 
 
 
 
Working Paper Series 
  
ISSN 1664-7041 (print) 
 ISSN 1664-705X (online) 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dynamic R&D Networks ✩
Michael D. Ko¨niga,b
aDepartment of Economics, University of Zu¨rich, Mu¨hlebachstrasse 86, CH 8008 Zu¨rich, Switzerland.
bSIEPR & Department of Economics, Stanford University, 579 Serra Mall, CA 94305-6072, United States
Abstract
In this paper we analyze R&D collaboration networks in industries where firms are
competitors in the product market. Firms’ benefits from collaborations arise by shar-
ing knowledge about a cost-reducing technology. By forming collaborations, however,
firms also change their own competitive position in the market as well as the overall
market structure. We analyze incentives of firms to form R&D collaborations with
other firms and the implications of these alliance decisions for the overall network
structure. We provide a general characterization of both equilibrium networks and
endogenous production choices, and compare it to the efficient network architecture.
We also allow for firms to differ in their technological characteristics, investigate how
this affects their propensity to collaborate and study the resulting network architec-
ture.
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JEL: C63, D83, D85, L22
1. Introduction
R&D partnerships have become a widespread phenomenon characterizing technolog-
ical dynamics, especially in industries [Hagedoorn, 2002] with rapid technological de-
velopment such as, for instance, the pharmaceutical, chemical and computer indus-
tries [seeAhuja, 2000; Powell et al., 2005; Riccaboni and Pammolli, 2002; Roijakkers and Hagedoorn,
2006]. In those industries, firms have become more specialized in specific domains of
a technology and they tend to combine their knowledge with that of other firms that
are specialized in different domains [Ahuja, 2000; Powell et al., 1996] in order to jointly
reduce their production costs.
In this paper we study the incentives of firms to form R&D collaborations with
other firms and the implications of these alliance decisions for the overall network
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structure. Moreover, we investigate the effects of network formation on the level of
social welfare generated.
For this purpose, we extend the analysis of R&D intensive industries presented in
Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez [2001],which was restricted to regular graphs and net-
works comprising of three firms, to take into account general equilibrium structures
with an arbitrary number of firms and no ex ante restriction on the collaboration pat-
tern between them. As in Westbrock [2010], we also allow for consumption goods to
be imperfect substitutes by adopting the consumer utility maximization approach of
Singh and Vives [1984].1
Our analysis bears similarities with a number of other recent contributions in as
they analyze a similar payoff structure. First, a partial equilibrium analysis has been
given in the seminal paper of Ballester et al. [2006]. These authors derive equilibrium
outcomes if a condition on the eigenvalue of the underlying network is satisfied, while
assuming that the network is exogenously given. Bramoulle´ et al. [2010] study Nash
equilibria for the case of strategic substitutes and an exogenously given network. Dif-
ferently to both of these contributions, we make the network as well as action choices
endogenous.2 Our approach is a generalization of the endogenous network formation
mechanisms proposed in Snijders [2001] and Mele [2010]. Moreover, Cabrales et al.
[2010] allow the network to be formed endogenously, but assume that link strengths
are proportional to effort levels, while we make the linking decision depending on
marginal payoffs. Finally, in the empirical paper by Ko¨nig et al. [2011] a similar market
structure is considered, however, the focus lies on developing optimal R&D subsidy
strategies and characterizing the firms that are most critical in terms of their contribu-
tion to the overall productivity of the economy.
2. The Model
We consider a Cournot oligopoly game in which a set N = {1, . . . , n} of firms is com-
peting in a homogeneous product market.3 Following Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez
[2001] we assume that firms are not only competitors in the product market, but they
can also form pairwise collaborative agreements. These pairwise links involve a com-
mitment to share R&D results and thus lead to lower marginal cost of production of
1Note also that differently to Goyal and Joshi [2003], we assume that the cost reduction achieved by
an R&D collaboration also depends on the R&D effort of the firms participating in that collaboration.
2It is straightforward to see that the results obtained in this paper can be generalized to the payoff
structure introduced in Ballester et al. [2006].
3Generalizations to Bertrand competition are straight forward [Westbrock, 2010].
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the collaborating firms. The amount of this cost reduction depends on the effort the
firms invest into R&D. Given the collaboration network G , each firm sets an R&D ef-
fort level unilaterally.4 We assume that firms can only jointly develop a cost reducing
technology. Given the effort levels ei, marginal cost ci of firm i is given by
5,6
ci(e,G) = c¯− αei − β
n
∑
j=1
aijej, (1)
where aij = 1 if firms i and j set up a collaboration (0 otherwise) and aii = 0. The
parameter α ∈ [0, 1] measures the relative cost reduction due to a firms’ own R&D
effort while the parameter β ∈ [0, 1] measures the relative cost reduction due to the
R&D effort of its collaboration partners. In this model, firms are exposed to busi-
ness stealing effects if their rivals increase their output via cost reducing R&D col-
laborations. In order to guarantee non-negative marginal costs we assume that ei ∈
[0, e¯] and c¯ ≥ (n − 1)e¯. This shows that c¯ must be of the order of O(n). As in
Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez [2001], throughout the paper we shall assume parame-
ter are constrained such that the second-order conditions hold and equilibria can be
characterized in terms of first-order conditions and are interior.
Moreover, we also assume that firms incur a direct cost γ ≥ 0 for their R&D efforts
and a fixed cost ζ ≥ 0 for each R&D collaboration.7 The profit of firm i, given the R&D
network G and the quantities q and efforts e, is then given by
pii(q, e,G) = (pi − ci)qi − γe2i − ζdi .
Inserting marginal cost from Equation (1) gives
pii(q, e,G) = piqi − c¯qi + αqiei + βqi
n
∑
j=1
aijej − γe2i − ζdi .
4See also Kamien et al. [1992] for a similar model of competitive RJVs in which firms unilaterally
choose their R&D effort levels.
5Note that we have neglected spillovers among non-collaborating firms.
6This generalizes earlier studies such as the one by D’Aspremont and Jacquemin [1988] where
spillovers were assumed to take place between all firms in the industry and no distinction between
collaborating and non-collaborating firms was made.
7Observe that the direct cost ζ of collaboration is incurred by the firm initiating the collaboration.
Therefore, it is the degree di of the firm i that appears in its profit function. We assume that R&D
collaborations can only be formed if both firms agree to its establishment. One can show that marginal
profit of a firm j towhich firm i proposes a collaboration is given by pij(q,G+ ij)−pij(q,G) = ρqiqj ≥ 0,
with a constant ρ ≥ 0. Since marginal profits are always non-negative, the firm j always accepts the
proposed collaboration of i. This is a consequence of the assumption that firms are myopic and will be
further discussed in Section 3.2.
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The first-order condition with respect to R&D effort ei is given by
∂pii(q, e,G)
∂ei
= αqi − 2γei = 0. (2)
Solving for ei and taking into account that ei ∈ [0, e¯] delivers
ei = min{λqi, e¯}, (3)
where we have denoted by λ = α2γ . An interior solution hence requires that qi ≤ q¯ ≡
2γ
α e¯ ≤ 2γc¯α(n−1) for all i = 1, . . . , n. Since c¯ is O(n) we thus require that qi is O(1). This
means that quantities produced do not grow without bound as the number of firms
in the industry becomes large. Equation (3) can be viewed as reflecting learning-by-
doing effects on R&D efforts. Various empirical studies have found that the R&D effort
of a firm is proportional its output or size [Cohen and Klepper, 1996a,b]. We then can
write marginal costs from Equation (1) as follows8
ci(e(q),G) = c¯− λαqi − λβ
n
∑
j=1
aijqj. (4)
Profits can be written as
pii(q,G) = piqi − c¯qi − λαq2i + λβqi
n
∑
j=1
aijqj − λ2γq2i − ζdi . (5)
Next we consider the demand for goods produced by firm i. A representative
consumer maximizes [Singh and Vives, 1984]
U(I, q1, . . . , qn) = I + a
n
∑
i=1
qi − 12
n
∑
i=1
q2i −
b
2
n
∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
qiqj, (6)
with the budget constraint I + ∑ni=1 qi ≤ E and endowment E. The parameter a cap-
tures the total size of the market, whereas b ∈ (0, 1], measures the degree of sub-
stitutability between products. In particular, b = 1 depicts a market of perfect sub-
stitutable goods, while b → 0 represents the case of almost independent markets.
The constraint is binding and the utility maximization of the representative consumer
8We assume that firms always implement the optimal R&D effort level. Since the optimal R&D effort
decision only depends on a firm’s own output, a firm does not face any uncertainty when implementing
this strategy. In Section 3.2 we will, however, introduce noise in the optimal output and collaboration
decisions, since these depend on the decisions of all other firms in the industry and their characteristics,
which might be harder to observe.
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gives the inverse demand function for firm i
pi = a− qi − b∑
j 6=i
qj. (7)
Firms face an inverse linear demand as given in Equation (7). Firm i then sets its
quantity qi in order to maximize its profit pii given by Equation (5). We also assume
that there is a maximum production capacity q¯ such that qi ≤ q¯ for all i ∈ N. Inserting
marginal cost from Equation (4) and inverse demand from Equation (7) we can write
firm i’s profit as
pii(q,G) = (a− c¯)qi − (1− λα + λ2γ)q2i − bqi ∑
j 6=i
qj + λβ
n
∑
j=1
aijqiqj − ζdi . (8)
We assume that a > c¯. Since c¯ must be of the order of O(n) this also implies that
a is O(n). In the following we will denote by η = (a − c¯)/n (which is O(1)), ν =
1− λα + λ2γ and ρ = λβ, so that Equation (8) becomes
pii(q,G) = nηqi − νq2i︸ ︷︷ ︸
own concavity
−bqi
n
∑
j 6=i
qj︸ ︷︷ ︸
global substitutability
+ ρqi
n
∑
j=1
aijqj︸ ︷︷ ︸
local complementarity
−ζdi . (9)
Firm i ∈ N sets its quantity qi and makes profit pii given by Equation (9). The corre-
sponding first-order conditions are given by
∂pii(q,G)
∂qi
= nη − 2νqi − b
n
∑
j 6=i
qj + ρ
n
∑
j=1
aijqj = 0. (10)
The second-order derivatives for j 6= i are given by
∂2pii(q,G)
∂qj∂qi
=
∂2pii
∂qi∂qj
= −b+ ρaij, (11)
which is negative if b > ρ, and
∂2pii
∂q2i
= −2ν ≤ 0, (12)
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if ν ≥ 0. From Equation (10) we can write firm i’s best response quantity as
qi = fi(q−i,G) ≡ nη2ν −
b
2ν ∑
j∈N\{i}
qj +
ρ
2ν ∑
j∈Ni
qj =
nη
2ν
− b
2ν ∑
j/∈(Ni∪{i})
qj +
ρ− b
2ν ∑
j∈Ni
qj.
(13)
with the constraint that 0 ≤ qi ≤ q¯. Equation (13) shows that output of i is decreasing
in the output of the firms j not connected to i. Moreover, if ρ < b, then firm i’s output
is also decreasing in its neighbors’ output. However, if ρ > b, i’s output is increasing
in its neighbors’ output. Note that the best response in Equation (13) is similar to the
class of local spillover games discussed in Goyal and Joshi [2006].
Let us first consider the case of ζ = 0, such that firms do not incur a fixed cost for
an R&D collaboration. Then the best response of firm i can be written as follows
qi = min (q¯, max (0, fi(q−i,G))) . (14)
Observe that if fi(q−i,G) < 0, then the business stealing effects become so large, that
firm i’s best response is to leave the market (qi = 0). If ζ > 0 then firm i’s best response
is
qi =

min (q¯, fi(q−i,G)) , if pii( fi(q−i,G),G) > 0,0, otherwise. (15)
The set of networks G for which qi > 0 is starkly reduced if ζ > 0, and if ζ becomes
large enough, no firm will operate at positive quantity.
For the remainder of this section we analyze the best response dynamics of quan-
tities in a fixed network G where firms adjust their output levels optimally, given the
output levels of all other firms in the industry [Corchon and Mas-Colell, 1996;Weibull,
1997]. We also assume that an interior equilibrium exists. This dynamics is given by
dqi
dt
= fi(q−i,G)− qi = nη2ν −
b
2ν
n
∑
j 6=i
qj +
ρ
2ν
n
∑
j=1
aijqj − qi, (16)
with some appropriate initial conditions q(0) ≥ 0. The equilibrium quantities for a
given network G can be obtained as the fixed points of the best response dynamics. In
vector-matrix notation the dynamics can be written as
dq
dt
=
nη
2ν
u− 1
2ν
(
(2ν− b)In + buu⊤ − ρA
)
q. (17)
This is an inhomogeneous linear first-order ordinary differential equation with con-
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stant coefficients. Let us denote by U = uu⊤ and introduce the matrix
Q ≡ In + b
2ν− bU−
ρ
2ν− bA. (18)
The solution of Equation (17) is stable if an only if all eigenvalues of Q have a positive
real part. If a stable solution exists and if Q is invertible, then the steady state q∗ =
limt→∞ q(t) is given by
q∗ =
nη
2ν− bQ
−1u, (19)
and the solution trajectory is given by
q(t) = q∗ + e−Qt(q(0)− q∗). (20)
If q(0) = 0 then we can write
q(t) =
nη
2ν− b
(
1− e−Qt
)
Q−1u. (21)
We have that Q = In − ρ2ν−bA, and λi(Q) = 1 − ρ2ν−bλi(A). This implies that the
stability condition λmin(Q) < 0 is equivalent to λmax(A) >
2ν−b
ρ . The latter condition
will be important when analyzing the equilibrium outcomes in the following sections.
3. Stability
In the following we provide an equilibrium analysis of the R&D collaboration game
with profits introduced in the previous section. More precisely, in Section 3.1 we an-
alyze equilibrium quantities and payoffs for a given network structure and in Section
3.2 we also allow the network to be endogenously determined by the link incentives
of firms.
3.1. Equilibrium Analysis for Exogenous Networks
The profit function introduced in Equation (9) admits a potential game with a corre-
sponding potential function [Monderer and Shapley, 1996]. This is stated in the fol-
lowing proposition.
Proposition 1. For a given network G ∈ Gn, the profit function of Equation (9) admits a
potential game with potential function φ(q,G) : Rn+ ×Gn → R given by
φ(q,G) =
n
∑
i=1
(nηqi − νq2i )−
b
2
n
∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
qiqj +
ρ
2
n
∑
i=1
n
∑
j=1
aijqiqj. (22)
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PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1. The potential φ(q,G) of Equation (44) has the property
that for any q′i 6= qi ∈ [0, q¯] we have that
φ(q′i ,q−i,G)− φ(qi,q−i,G) = nη(q′i − qi)− ν(q′2i − q2i )− b(q′i − qi)∑
j 6=i
qj + ρ(q
′
i − qi) ∑
j∈Ni
qj
= pii(q
′
i ,q−i,G)− pii(qi,q−i,G).
✷
The existence of a potential function given in Equation (44) allows us to state a condi-
tion for all Nash equilibria of our game. For a given network G and no fixed linking
costs, ζ = 0, a Nash equilibrium of our game solves the following constrained opti-
mization problem (cf. Bramoulle´ et al. [2010] and Sandholm [2010, Sec. 3.1.4])
max
q∈Rn+
φ(q,G) (23)
s.t. ∀i = 1, . . . , n
∂φ
∂qi
= 0 and qi > 0, or (24)
∂φ
∂qi
≤ 0 and qi = 0. (25)
We can write the potential function φ(q,G) in vector-matrix notation as follows
φ(q,G) = nηu⊤q− 1
2
q⊤ ((2ν− b)In + bU− ρA)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=(2ν−b)Q
q. (26)
The Hessian of the potential is given by ∆φ(q,G) =
(
∂2φ(q,G)
∂qi∂qj
)
i,j∈N
= −(2ν − b)Q. If
2ν > b and the matrix Q is positive definite then ∆φ(q,G) < 0 is negative definite.9
The matrix Q is positive definite if and only if the matrix B = In − ρ2ν−bA is positive
definite. If B is positive definite then its inverse B−1 exists and is positive definite. B−1
exists if and only if the following eigenvalue condition is satisfied
ρ
2ν− b <
1
λmax(A)
, (27)
9The n× nmatrix Q is positive definite if and only if for all q ∈ Rn+ we have that q⊤Qq > 0. If Q is
positive definite, then all its eigenvalues are positive.
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where λmax(A) is the largest (real) eigenvalue of the (real and symmetric) adjacency
matrixA. If the inequality in (27) is satisfied, then themaximization of φ(q,G) as stated
in (25), for a givenG, is a linear-quadratic programming problem [Boyd and Vandenberghe,
2004; Lee et al., 2005], where φ(q,G) is a concave function of q, and this optimization
problem has a unique solution.
In the following we assume that the inequality in (27) is satisfied. Then we can
obtain firms’ equilibrium quantities and profits as follows:
Proposition 2. Denote by ϕ = ρ2ν−b =
αβ
2(2−b)γ−α2 and consider a network G ∈ Gn satisfying
ϕ < 1/λmax(A).
(i) If ζ = 0, equilibrium output and profit are given by
qi =
nη
2ν + b(‖b(G, ϕ)‖ − 1)bi(G, ϕ) (28)
and
pii =
νn2η2
(2ν + b(‖b(G, ϕ) − 1‖))2 b
2
i (G, ϕ), (29)
for all i = 1, . . . , n.
(ii) If ζ > 0 and pii > ζdi for all i = 1, . . . , n in Equation (29) then equilibrium quantities
are given by Equation (28) and equilibrium profits are given by Equation (29) less the
cost of collaboration ζdi .
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2. Equation (56) can be written as
qi − ρ2ν− b
n
∑
j=1
aijqj =
nη
2ν− b −
b
2ν− b‖q‖ (30)
where ‖q‖ = u⊤q. Let us denote by ϕ = ρ2ν−b , A = nη2ν−b and B = b2ν−b . Then, in
vector-matrix notation, the above equation can then be written as
(In − ϕA) q = (A− B‖q‖)u. (31)
If ϕ < 1λmax (A) then the matrix In − ϕA is invertible, and we obtain
q = (A− B‖q‖) (In − ϕA)−1 u. (32)
Noting that
(In − ϕA)−1 u = b(G, ϕ), (33)
where b(G, ϕ) is the vector of Bonacich centralities with parameter ϕ [Bonacich, 1987],
we obtain
q = (A− B‖q‖)b(G, ϕ). (34)
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With
‖q‖ = (A− B‖q‖)‖b(G, ϕ)‖ (35)
we obtain
‖q‖ = A‖b(G, ϕ)‖
1+ B‖b(G, ϕ)‖) (36)
and it follows that
q =
A
1+ B‖b(G, ϕ)‖)b(G, ϕ) =
nη
2ν + b(‖b(G, ϕ)‖ − 1)b(G, ϕ). (37)
Next, we compute equilibrium profits. Let us denote by C =
nη
2ν+b(‖b(G,ϕ)‖−1) , so that
qi = Abi(G, ϕ). Profit of firm i from Equation (9) can then be written as
pii = nηCbi(G, ϕ)− (ν− b)C2bi(G, ϕ)2 − bC2‖b(G, ϕ)‖bi(G, ϕ)
+ ρC2bi(G, ϕ)
n
∑
j=1
aijbj(G, ϕ)− ζdi . (38)
Using the fact that
bi(G, ϕ) = 1+
ρ
2ν− b
n
∑
j=1
aijbj(G, ϕ) (39)
we obtain
pii = nηCbi(G, ϕ)− (ν− b)C2bi(G, ϕ)2 − bC2‖b(G, ϕ)‖bi(G, ϕ)
+ ρC2(2ν− b)bi(G, ϕ)(bi(G, ϕ)− 1)− ζdi .
= νC2bi(G, ϕ)
2 − ζdi. (40)
which gives
pii =
n2η2ν
(2ν + b(‖b(G, ϕ)‖ − 1))2 b
2
i (G, ϕ)− ζdi . (41)
✷
Observe that, in the limit ϕ ↑ λ−1max, the normalized Bonacich centrality converges to
the eigenvector centrality v, where Av = λmaxv. This implies that
lim
ϕ↑λ−1max
qi =
nη
b
vi (42)
and
lim
ϕ↑λ−1max
pii =
nη2ν
b2
v2i − ζdi , (43)
for all i = 1, . . . , n.
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Figure 1: A star network with n = 3, λmax(A) =
√
2 = 1.41 and no linking costs, i.e. ζ = 0. The
top left panel shows the evolution q(t) for ϕ = 1/3 < λmax(A)−1 = 0.70, the top right panel for
ϕ = λmax(A)−1 = 0.70, the bottom left panel for ϕ = 4/3 > λmax(A)−1 = 0.70, and the bottom right
panel for ϕ = 3/2 > λmax(A)−1 = 0.70. The dashed lines indicate the solutions from Equation (28).
Note that if the eigenvalue condition (27) is not satisfied, then corner solutions
must be considered.10
In Figure 1 we give an example of the evolution of q(t) from Equation (17) for the
star network K1,n−1 with n = 3. The stationary state q∗ for values of ϕ ≤ λmax(A)−1
is correctly described by Equation (28). Interestingly, this solution is also correct for
values of ϕ > λmax(A)−1 (see bottom left panel in Figure 1), unless the equilibrium
quantities from Equation (28) explode (see bottom right panel in Figure 1), and qi(t)
grows to its capacity constraint q¯.
3.2. Equilibrium Analysis with Endogenous Networks
Similar to the analysis in the previous section, we can provide a potential function that
not only accounts for quantity adjustments but also for the linking strategies.
Proposition 3. Assume that both, quantities and links can be changed according to a myopic
profit maximizing rationale of firms. Then the profit function of Equation (9) admits a potential
10See Bramoulle´ et al. [2010] for the case of strategic substitutes and Cabrales et al. [2010] for the case
of strategic complements and linking strengths proportional to socialization effort.
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game with potential function Φ : Rn+ × Gn → R given by
Φ(q,G) =
n
∑
i=1
(nηqi − νq2i )−
b
2
n
∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
qiqj +
ρ
2
n
∑
i=1
n
∑
j=1
aijqiqj− ζm = φ(q,G)− ζm. (44)
where m is the number of links in G.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3. The potential Φ(q,G) has the property that
Φ(q,G+ ij)−Φ(q,G) = ρqiqj − ζ = pii(q,G+ ij)− pii(q,G). (45)
From the properties of pii(q,G) it also follows that Φ(q
′
i ,q−i,G) − Φ(qi ,q−i,G) =
φ(q′i ,q−i,G)− φ(qi,q−i,G) = pii(q′i ,q−i,G)− pii(qi,q−i,G). ✷
In this section we allow the network to be formed endogenously, based on the
profit maximizing decisions of firms with whom to collaborate, and share knowledge
about a cost reducing technology. The precise definition of the dynamics of quantity
adjustment and network evolution is given in the following:
Definition 1. The evolution of the industry is characterized by a sequence of states (ωt)t∈R+ ,
ωt ∈ Ω, where each state ωt = (q,Gt) consists of a vector of firms’ quantities qt ∈ [0, q¯]n
and a network of collaborations Gt ∈ Gn. In a short time interval [t, t+ ∆t), t ∈ R+, one of
the following events happens:
Action adjustment At rate νn a firm i ∈ N is selected at random and given a revision op-
portunity of its current output level qi. When firm i receives such a revision opportunity,
it draws a quantity q′i ∈ [0, q¯] uniformly at random (with probability 1/q¯) and evalu-
ates its marginal profits from changing its quantity to q′i. The computation of marginal
profits is perturbed by an additive i.i.d. shock εit, so that the probability that we observe
a switch from output level qi to q
′
i is given by
P
(
ωt+∆t = (q
′
i ,q−it,Gt)|ωt = (qi,q−it,Gt)
)
=
ν
q¯
P
(
pii(q
′
i ,q−i,Gt)− pii(qi,q−i,Gt) + εit > 0
)
∆t
=
ν
q¯
P
(
Φ(q′i ,q−i,Gt)−Φ(qi ,q−i,Gt) + εit > 0
)
∆t.
where ϑ is a scale parameter measuring the extent of noise relative to profit maximization,
and we have used the fact that pii(q
′
i ,q−i,Gt) − pii(qi,q−i,Gt) = Φ(q′i ,q−i,Gt) −
Φ(qi ,q−i,Gt).
Link formation With rate λ > 0 a pair of firms ij which is not already connected receives
an opportunity to form a link. The formation of a link depends on the marginal profit the
firms receive from the link plus an additive pairwise i.i.d. error term εij,t. The probability
that link ij is created is then given by
P (ωt+∆t = (qt,Gt + ij)|ωt−1 = (q,Gt)) = λP
({pii(qt,Gt + ij)− pii(qt,Gt) + εij,t > 0}
∩{pij(qt,Gt + ij)− pij(qt,Gt) + εij,t > 0}
)
∆t
= λP
(
Φ(qt,Gt + ij)−Φ(qt,Gt) + εij,t > 0
)
∆t,
12
where we have used the fact that pii(qt,Gt + ij) − pii(qt,Gt) = pij(qt,Gt + ij) −
pij(qt,Gt) = Φ(qt,Gt + ij)−Φ(qt,Gt).
Link removal With rate ξ > 0 a pair of connected firms ij receives an opportunity to termi-
nate their connection. The link is removed if at least one firm find this profitable. The
marginal profits from removing the link ij are perturbed by an additive pairwise i.i.d.
error term εij,t. The probability that link ij is removed is then given by
P (ωt+∆t = (qt,Gt − ij)|ωt = (q,Gt)) = ξP
({pii(qt,Gt − ij)− pii(qt,Gt) + εij,t > 0}
∪{pij(qt,Gt− ij)− pij(qt,Gt) + εij,t > 0}
)
∆t
= ξP
(
Φ(qt,Gt − ij)−Φ(qt,Gt) + εij,t >
)
∆t,
where we have used the fact that pii(qt,Gt − ij) − pii(qt,Gt) = pij(qt,Gt − ij) −
pij(qt,Gt) = Φ(qt,Gt− ij)−Φ(qt,Gt).
In the following we make a specific assumption on the distribution of the random
shocks. In particular, we assume that these shocks are independent and identically
exponentially distributed with parameter ϑ ≥ 0. We then can write11
P
(
ωt+∆t = (q
′
i,q−it,Gt)|ωt = (qi,q−it,Gt)
)
= P
(−εit < Φ(q′i ,q−it,Gt)−Φ(qi ,q−i,Gt))
=
ν
q¯
eϑΦ(q
′
i,q−i,Gt)
eϑΦ(q
′
i,q−it,Gt) + eϑΦ(qi,q−it,Gt)
∆t, (46)
and similarly we obtain for the creation of the link ij
P (ωt+∆t = (qt,Gt + ij)|ωt = (qt,Gt)) = P
(−εij,t < Φ(qt,Gt + ij)−Φ(qt,Gt))
= λ
eϑΦ(qt,Gt+ij)
eϑΦ(qt,Gt+ij) + eϑΦ(qt,Gt)
∆t, (47)
and the removal of the link ij
P (ωt+∆t = (qt,Gt− ij)|ωt = (qt,Gt)) = P
(−εij,t < Φ(qt,Gt − ij)−Φ(qt,Gt))
= ξ
eϑΦ(qt,Gt−ij)
eϑΦ(qt,Gt−ij) + eϑΦ(qt,Gt)
∆t. (48)
Let F denote the smallest σ-algebra generated byœ (ωt : t ∈ R+). The filtration is the
non-decreasing family of sub-σ-fields {Ft}t∈R+ on the measure space (Ω,F ), with
the property that F0 ⊆ F1 ⊆ · · · ⊆ Ft ⊆ · · · ⊆ F . The probability space is
11Let ν be i.i. logistically distributed with mean 0 and scale parameter ϑ, i.e. Fν(x) =
eϑx
1+eϑx
. Consider
the random variable ε = g(ν) = −ν. Since g is monotonic decreasing, and ν is a continuous random
variable, the distribution of ε is given by Fε(y) = 1− Fν(g−1(y)) = eϑy1+eϑy .
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given by the triple (Ω,F ,P), where P : F → [0, 1] is the probability measure satis-
fying
∫
Ω
P(ω)dµ(ω) = 1. The sequence of states (ωt)t∈R+ , ωt ∈ Ω induces an irre-
ducible and aperiodic (i.e. ergodic) Markov chain. The one step transition probability
P : Ω2 → [0, 1] from a state ω ∈ Ω to a state ω′ ∈ Ω is given by
P(ωt+∆t = ω
′|Ft = σ(ω0,ω1, . . . ,ωt = ω)) = P(ωt+∆t = ω′|ωt = ω)
= p(ω′|ω)∆t,
where p(ω′|ω) is the transition rate from state ω to state ω′. Observe that any function
f : Ω → R of the state variables ω ∈ Ω is a Carathe´odory function since f (q, ·) is con-
tinuous for each q ∈ [0, q¯]n and f (·,G) is (Gn,BG) measurable [Aliprantis and Border,
2006].
In vector-matrix notation we can write Φ(q,G) = φ(q,G) − ζ2u⊤Au. With the
potential function Φ(q,G) we then can state the following proposition.
Proposition 4. The dynamic process (ωt)t∈R+ induces an irreducible and aperiodic Markov
chain with a unique stationary distribution µϑ : [0, q¯]n×Gn → [0, 1] such that limt→∞ P(ωt =
(q,G)|ω0 = (q0,G0)) = µϑ(q,G). The (Carathe´odory) probability measure µϑ is given by
µϑ(q,G) =
e
ϑΦ(q,G)−m ln
(
ξ
λ
)
∑G′∈Gn
∫
[0,q¯]n e
ϑΦ(q′,G′)−m′ ln
(
ξ
λ
)
dq′
. (49)
In the limit of vanishing noise ϑ → ∞, the (stochastically stable) states in the support
of µϑ are given by [Kandori et al., 1993]
lim
ϑ→∞
µϑ(q,G)

> 0, if Φ(q,G) ≥ Φ(q
′,G′), ∀q′ ∈ [0, q¯]n, G′ ∈ Gn,
= 0, otherwise.
(50)
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4. In the following we show that the stationary distribution
µϑ(ω) satisfies the detailed balance condition
µϑ(ω)p(ω′|ω) = µϑ(ω′)p(ω|ω′) (51)
where p(ω′|ω) denotes the transition rate of the Markov chain from state ω to ω′.
Observe that the detailed balance condition is trivially satisfied if ω′ and ω differ in
more than one link or more than one quantity level. Hence, we consider only the case
of link creation G′ = G+ ij (and removal G′ = G− ij) or and adjustment in quantity
q′i 6= qi for some i ∈ N. For the case of link creation with a transition from ω = (q,G)
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to ω′ = (q,G+ ij) we can write the detailed balance condition as follows
e
ϑΦ(q,G)−m ln
(
ξ
λ
)
eϑΦ(q,G+ij)
eϑΦ(q,G+ij)+ eϑΦ(q,G)
λ = e
ϑΦ(q,G+ij)−(m+1) ln
(
ξ
λ
)
eϑΦ(q,G)
eϑΦ(q,G) + eϑΦ(q,G+ij)
ξ.
This equality is trivially satisfied. A similar argument holds for the removal of a link
with a transition from ω = (q,G) to ω = (q,G− ij) where the detailed balance con-
dition reads
e
ϑΦ(q,G)−m ln
(
ξ
λ
)
eϑΦ(q,G−ij)
eϑΦ(q,G−ij)+ eϑΦ(q,G)
ξ = e
ϑΦ(q,G+ij)−(m−1) ln
(
ξ
λ
)
eϑΦ(q,G)
eϑΦ(q,G) + eϑΦ(q,G−ij)
λ.
For a change in the output level with a transition from ω = (qi ,q−i,G) to ω′ =
(q′i ,q−i,G) we get for the detailed balance condition
e
ϑΦ(qi,q−i,G)−m ln
(
ξ
λ
)
eϑΦ(q
′
i,q−i,G)
eϑΦ(q
′
i,q−i,G) + eϑΦ(qi,q−i,G)
ν
q¯
= e
ϑΦ(q′i,q−i,G)−(m+1) ln
(
ξ
λ
)
eϑΦ(qi,q−i,G)
eϑΦ(qi,q−i,G) + eϑΦ(q
′
i,q−i,G)
ν
q¯
,
Hence, the probability measure µϑ(ω) satisfies a detailed balance condition and there-
fore is the stationary distribution of the Markov chain with transition rates p(ω′|ω).
✷
Note that we could also allow quantity adjustments of Definition 1 to follow a
noisy directional learning process as in Anderson et al. [1998, 2002, 2004].12 Quantity
adjustments then follow a logit dynamics with continuous strategies such that
P
(
ωt+∆t = (q
′
i ,q−it,Gt)|ωt = (qi,q−it,Gt)
)
= ν
eϑpii(q
′
i,q−it,Gt)∫
[0,q¯] e
ϑpii(q,q−it,Gt)dq
∆t.
However, this alternative definition would give rise to the same stationary distribution
µϑ as in Proposition 4.
In the following we will set λ = ξ. The stationary distribution µϑ(q,G) can be
further analyzed by computing the partition function 13
Zϑ = ∑
G∈Gn
∫
[0,q¯]n
eϑΦ(q,G)dq, (52)
12Mattsson and Weibull [2002] provide a motivation from boundedly rational choices with imple-
mentation costs.
13See Park and Newman [2004] for an excellent discussion in the context of exponential random
graphs.
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so that we can write µϑ(q,G) = eϑΦ(q,G)/Zϑ. Observe that the potential can be written
as
Φ(q,G) =
n
∑
i=1
(
a− c¯− νqi − b2 ∑
j 6=i
qj
)
qi︸ ︷︷ ︸
ψ(q)
+
n
∑
i=1
n
∑
j=i+1
aij (ρqiqj − ζ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
σij
.
We then have that
eϑΦ(q,G) = eϑψ(q)eϑ ∑
n
i<j aijσij .
Observe that only the second factor in the above expression is network dependent. We
then can use the fact that
∑
G∈Gn
e
ϑ ∑ni<j aijσij = ∏
i<j
(
1+ eϑσij
)
to obtain
∑
G∈Gn
eϑΦ(q,G) = eϑψ(q) ∏
i<j
(
1+ eϑσij
)
=
n
∏
i=1
eϑ(a−c¯−νqi−
b
2 ∑j 6=i qj)qi ∏
i<j
(
1+ eϑ(ρqiqj−ζ)
)
.
We can use this expression to compute the marginal distribution
µϑ(q) =
1
Zϑ
∑
G∈Gn
eϑΦ(q,G) =
1
Z ϑn
n
∏
i=1
eϑ(a−c¯−νqi−
b
2 ∑j 6=i qj)qi ∏
i<j
(
1+ eϑ(ρqiqj−ζ)
)
.
Moreover, it allows us to compute the probability of observing a network G given a
specified output distribution q.14
Proposition 5. The probability of observing a network G ∈ Gn, given an output distribution
q ∈ [0, q¯]n is determined by conditional distribution
µϑ(G|q) = ∏
i<j
eϑaij(ρqiqj−ζ)
1+ eϑ(ρqiqj−ζ)
, (53)
which is equivalent to the probability of observing an inhomogeneous random graph with link
14For a discussion of inhomogeneous random graphs see Bolloba´s et al. [2001]; Van Der Hofstad
[2009] and the “hidden variables” model studied in Bogun˜a´ and Pastor-Satorras [2003]. Observe that
the complementary problem of determining the distribution of random variables that depend only on
their neighbors in a given network G is associated with a Markov random field, whose distribution is
a Gibbs measure (by the Hammersley-Clifford theorem), and can be decomposed into a sum over all
cliques in G (Besag [1974] and Kolaczyk [2009, Chap. 8] as well as Rue and Held [2005]).
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probability
pij =
eϑ(ρqiqj−ζ)
1+ eϑ(ρqiqj−ζ)
. (54)
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5. The conditional distribution is given by
µϑ(G|q) = µ
ϑ(q,G)
µϑ(q)
=
eϑΦ(q,G)
∏
n
i=1 e
ϑ(a−c¯−νqi− b2 ∑j 6=i qj)qi ∏i<j
(
1+ eϑ(ρqiqj−ζ)
)
=
e
ϑ ∑ni<j aij(ρqiqj−ζ)
∏i<j
(
1+ eϑ(ρqiqj−ζ)
)
= ∏
i<j
eϑaij(ρqiqj−ζ)
1+ eϑ(ρqiqj−ζ)
= ∏
i<j
(
eϑ(ρqiqj−ζ)
1+ eϑ(ρqiqj−ζ)
)aij (
1− e
ϑ(ρqiqj−ζ)
1+ eϑ(ρqiqj−ζ)
)1−aij
= ∏
i<j
p
aij
ij
(
1− pij
)1−aij .
✷
Proposition 5 has a number of important implications. Numerous empirical stud-
ies have shown that the distribution of output levels among firms tends to follow
a power-law distribution (Zipf’s law) [Axtell, 2001; Gabaix, 1999; Growiec et al., 2008;
Stanley et al., 1996]. If the output levels qi and qj in the link probability of Equation (54)
are distributed according to a power-law, then we obtain the so called fitness model an-
alyzed in Bogun˜a´ and Pastor-Satorras [2003]; Caldarelli et al. [2002]. This models also
refer to random threshold graphs [Diaconis et al., 2008; Ide and Konno, 2007; Ide et al.,
2010]. It has been shown that this model produces a number of interesting characteris-
tics, such as a power-law degree distribution. This distribution has been documented
in various empirical studies of R&D networks [Gay and Dousset, 2005; Powell et al.,
2005].
A special case is one in which all firms produce at the same fixed output level
qi = q0 ≤ q¯ for all i = 1, . . . , n and there are no substitutability effects, b = 0.
Proposition 6. Assume that all output levels are fixed and identically given by qi = q0 with
q0 ∈ [0, q¯] for all i = 1, . . . , n and there are no substitutability effects, b = 0. Then the
stochastically stable network is given by the complete graph Kn if ρq
2
0 > ζ and it is given by
the empty graph if ρq20 < ζ.
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Figure 2: The degree d¯+ = d¯− = m/n as a function of the linking cost ζ for a fixed, homogeneous
output distribution qi = 1 for all i = 1, . . . , n with b = 0, ρ = 2 and n = 10. The critical linking cost is
ζ∗ = ρq20 = 2.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6. When b = 0 then we can write the potential function as
Φ(q,G) =
n
∑
i=1
(nηqi − νq2i ) +
ρ
2
n
∑
i=1
n
∑
j=1
aijqiqj − ζm,
where we have used the fact that the number of links in G can be written as m =
∑
n
i=1 di = ∑
n
i=1 d
−
i =
1
2 ∑
n
i=1 di =
1
2u
⊤Au. For q = q0u we can write this as
Φ(q,G) = n2ηq0 − νnq20 +
1
2
(ρq20 − ζ)u⊤Au.
From this expression we see that Φ(q,G) is maximized for G = Kn if ρq
2
0 > ζ and
G = K¯n if ρq20 < ζ. ✷
The phase transition from the empty to the complete graph that occurs at ζ∗ = ρq20 is
shown in Figure 2 for different values of ζ and β for n = 10 nodes.
Proposition 7. Assume that the output levels are fixed and given by qi ∈ [0, q¯] for all i =
1, . . . , n and there are no substitutability effects, b = 0. Then the stochastically stable network
is given by a nested split graph with adjacency matrixA whose 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n elements are given
by
aij =
{
1, if ρqiqj > ζ,
0, if ρqiqj < ζ.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 7. When b = 0 and the output levels are fixed and given by
qi ∈ [0, q¯] for all i = 1, . . . , n then we can write the potential as
Φ(q,G) =
n
∑
i=1
(nηqi − νq2i ) +
1
2
n
∑
i=1
n
∑
j=1
aij(ρqiqj − ζ).
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The second term in the above expression for Φ(q,G) is a sum over positive terms with
aij = 1 if ρqiqj > ζ and negative otherwise. Hence, Φ(q,G) is maximized if aij = 1 for
all ρqiqj > ζ and aij = 0 for all ρqiqj < ζ. ✷
The marginal distribution for G ∈ Gn can be obtained from
µϑ(G) =
1
Zϑ
∫
[0,q¯]n
eϑΦ(G,q)dqn.
Using a Laplace expansion [Wong, 2001] around the equilibrium values q∗ of Equation
(28) we can write
µϑ(G) =
1
Zϑ
∫
[0,q¯]n
eϑΦ(G,q) ≈ 1
Zϑ
(
ϑ
2pi
) n
2
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(
∂2Φ(G,q)
∂qi∂qj
)
q=q∗
∣∣∣∣∣∣
− 12
eϑ(Φ(G,q
∗)),
and the conditional distribution is given by
µϑ(q|G) = µ
ϑ(G,q)
µϑ(G)
≈
(
ϑ
2pi
) n
2
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(
∂2Φ(G,q)
∂qi∂qj
)
q=q∗
∣∣∣∣∣∣
− 12
eϑ(Φ(G,q)−Φ(G,q
∗)).
We next analyze the partition sum Zϑ in more detail. Note that
Zϑ =
∫
[0,q¯]n
n
∏
i=1
eϑ(a−c¯−νqi−
b
2 ∑j 6=i qj)qi ∏
i<j
(
1+ eϑ(ρqiqj−ζ)
)
dq.
Next, we introduce the Hamiltonian defined by
H (q) ≡
n
∑
i=1
(
nηqi − νq2i + ∑
j>i
(
1
ϑ
ln
(
1+ eϑ(ρqiqj−ζ)
)
− bqiqj,
))
so that ∑G∈Gn e
Φ(q,G) = eH (q). Then we can write the partition function as
Zϑ =
∫
[0,q¯]n
eϑH (q)dq.
In the following we make a Laplace approximation of the partition function as follows
[Wong, 2001]
Zϑ ≈
(
2pi
ϑ
) n
2
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(
∂2H
∂qi∂qj
)
qi=q∗
∣∣∣∣∣∣
− 12
eH (q
∗), (55)
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where q∗ = argmaxq∈[0,q¯]n H (q), and the Hessian
∂2H
∂qi∂qj
for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n. We have that
∂H (q)
∂qi
= nη − 2νqi + ∑
j 6=i
(
ρ
2
(
1+ tanh
(
ϑ
2
(
ρqiqj − ζ
)))− b) qj.
For large n, the first order conditions imply that
η =
1
n ∑
j 6=i
(
b− ρ
2
(
1+ tanh
(
ϑ
2
(
ρqiqj − ζ
))))
qj.
Assuming symmetry qi = q for all i = 1, . . . , n we get
bq− η = ρ
2
(
1+ tanh
(
ϑ
2
(
ρq2 − ζ
)))
q. (56)
In the limit of ϑ → ∞ we obtain from the FOC of Equation (56) that
bq− η =

ρq, if ζ < ρq
2,
0, if ρq2 < ζ.
This shows that the right hand side of Equation (56) has a point of discontinuity at√
ζ
ρ (cf. Figure 3). It then follows that, in the limit of ϑ → ∞ (the stochastically stable
equilibrium), we have
q =


η
b−ρ , if ζ <
ρη2
b2
,{
η
b−ρ ,
η
ρ
}
, if
ρη2
b2
< ζ <
ρη2
(b−ρ)2 ,
η
ρ , if
ρη2
(b−ρ)2 < ζ,
which is increasing in ρ and η, and decreasing in ζ and b (cf. Figures 3 and 4).
We further have that
∂2H
∂qi∂qj
=


−2ν + ϑρ24 ∑j 6=i
(
1− tanh
(
ϑ
2
(
ρqiqj − ζ
))2)
q2j , if i = j,
ρ
2
(
1+ tanh
(
ϑ
2
(
ρqiqj − ζ
))) (
1+ ϑqiqj
ρ
2 tanh
(
ϑ
2
(
ρqiqj − ζ
)))− b, if i 6= j.
In the symmetric equilibrium qi = q for all i = 1, . . . , n this is
∂2H
∂qi∂qj
=

ϑ(n− 1)(bq− η)(η − (b− ρ)q), if i = j,ϑ(bq− η)(η − (b− ρ)q)− ηq , if i 6= j.
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Figure 3: (Left panel) The right hand side of Equation (56) for different values of ζ1 = 25, ζ2 = 10,
ζ3 = 3 and b = 4, ρ = 2, η = 6.5 and ϑ = 10. (Right panel) The values of q solving Equation (56) for
different values of ζ with b = 1.48, ρ = 0.45 and ϑ1 = 49.5, ϑ2 = 0.495, ϑ3 = 0.2475.
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Figure 4: (Left panel) The right hand side of Equation (56) for different values of η1 = 2.5, η2 = 6.5,
η3 = 10 and b = 4, ρ = 2, ζ = 10 and ϑ = 10. (Right panel) The values of q solving Equation (56) for
different values of η with b = 4, ρ = 2 and ϑ1 = 10, ϑ2 = 0.26, ϑ3 = 0.2.
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Using the fact that
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
a b b . . .
b a b . . .
b b a
...
...
. . .
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= (a− b)n−1(a+ (n− 1)b),
which is a special case of a circulant matrix and the determinant follows from the
general formula, we obtain∣∣∣∣∣∣
(
∂2H
∂qi∂qj
)
qi=q
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = 1qn (ϑ(n− 2)(bq− η)(η − (b− ρ)q)q+ η)n−1
× (2ϑ(n− 1)(bq− η)(η − (b− ρ)q)q− (n− 1)η) .
In the symmetric case qi = q for all i = 1, . . . , n the Laplace approximation of Equation
(55) can be written as
Zϑ ≈
(
2pi
ϑ
) n
2
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(
∂2H
∂qi∂qj
)
qi=q∗
∣∣∣∣∣∣
− 12
eϑnH (q
∗),
where
H (q) ≡ nηq− νq2 + (n− 1)
(
1
ϑ
ln
(
1+ eϑ(ρq
2−ζ)
)
− bq2
)
≈ n2
(
ηq+
1
ϑ
ln
(
1+ eϑ(ρq
2−ζ)
)
− bq2
)
,
for large n. We also introduce the free energy Fϑ ≡ − lnZϑ, which allows us to write
the expected number of links as follows
Eϑ(m) = ∑
G∈Gn
∫
[0,q¯]n
mµϑ(q,G)dq =
1
Zϑ
∑
G∈Gn
∫
[0,q¯]n
meϑΦ(q,G)︸ ︷︷ ︸
− 1ϑ ∂∂ζ eϑΦ(q,G)
dq
= − 1
ϑ
1
Zϑ
∂Zϑ
∂ζ
=
1
ϑ
∂Fϑ
∂ζ
.
From the Laplace approximation of the partition function we find that
∂Fϑ
∂ζ
≈ −ϑ ∂H (q)
∂ζ
+
1
2
tr

( ∂2H
∂qi∂qj
)−1
∂
∂ζ
(
∂2H
∂qi∂qj
) .
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We further have that
∂H
∂ζ
= −1
2
n
∑
i=1
n
∑
j>i
(
1+ tanh
(
ϑ
2
(
ρqiqj − ζ
)))
,
and in the symmetric equilibrium this is
(
∂H
∂ζ
)
qi=q
= −n(n− 1)
2
(
1+ tanh
(
ϑ
2
(
ρq2 − ζ
)))
.
Moreover we find that
∂2H
∂q2i
=
ϑ2ρ2
4
n
∑
j 6=i
tanh
(
ϑ
2
(
ρqiqj − ζ
))(
1− tanh
(
ϑ
2
(
ρqiqj − ζ
))2)
q2j ,
and
∂2H
∂qi∂qj
=
ϑρ
4
(
1− tanh
(
ϑ
2
(
ρqiqj − ζ
))2)(
ϑρqiqj tanh
(
ϑ
2
(
ρqiqj − ζ
))− 1) .
Assuming symmetry this is(
∂2H
∂q2i
)
qi=q
=
ϑ2(n− 1)
ρq
(2(bq− η)− ρq) (bq− η)(η − (b− ρ)q),
and (
∂2H
∂qi∂qj
)
qi=q
=
ϑ
ρq2
(bq− η)(η − (b− ρ)q)
(
2ϑq(bq− η)− ϑρq2 − 1
)
.
After some simplifications we then can write the expected number of links as follows
Eϑ(m) ≈ n(n− 1)bq − ηρq +
n
2
ϑ
(2b− ρ)q− 2η
ρq
=
n(n− 1)
2
(
1+ tanh
(
ϑ
2
(
ρq2 − ζ
)))
+O(n),
where q derives from Equation (56). Hence, the expected number of links is increasing
in ρ, q and η, and decreasing in ζ and b (by reducing the equilibrium quantity q). Note
that the above expression becomes exact as n becomes large.
With the partition functionZθ in Equation (55) we are able to compute themarginal
µϑ(q) = ∑
G∈Gn
µϑ(G,q) =
1
Zθ
n
∏
i=1
eϑ(a−c¯−νqi−
b
2 ∑j 6=i qj)qi ∏
i<j
(
1+ eϑ(ρqiqj−ζ)
)
,
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and the joint distribution can then be written as
µϑ(G,q) = µϑ(G|q)µϑ(q),
where the condition distribution µϑ(G|q) is given in Equation (53).
3.3. EndogenousNetworkswithHeterogeneous Spillovers among Firms
In this section we allow for unobserved heterogeneity among firms in terms of their
technological abilities. Let θi denote the technology level of firm i. We assume that
technology spillovers between firms are imperfect, and depend on their relative tech-
nological difference. We introduce a function f : [0, 1] × [0, 1] → [0, 1] capturing the
potential technology transfer between any pairs of firms. Let θi and θj be the technol-
ogy levels of firms i and j. A simple choice for the function f would then be
f (θi , θj) = |θi − θj|.
Other functional forms have been suggested in the literature [see e.g. Baum et al.,
2009],15 such as
f (θi , θj) = a1|θi − θj| − a2|θi − θj|2,
with a1, a2 ≥ 0. Let us denote by fij ≡ f (θi , θj). Given the spillover function f , the
marginal cost of production of a firm i becomes
ci = c¯− αei − β
n
∑
j=1
aij fijej
and profits of firm i are given by
pii = (a− c¯)qi − q2i − bqi ∑
j 6=i
qj + αqiei + βqi
n
∑
j=1
aij fijej − γe2i − ζdi .
The FOC with respect to effort ei is given by
∂pii
∂ei
= αqi − 2γei = 0,
from which it follows that
ei =
α
2γ
qi = λqi .
15See also Cowan and Jonard [2008, 2009]; Jonard et al. [2009]; Mu¨ller et al. [2009].
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Inserting into profits yields
pii = (a− c¯)qi − (1− λα + λ2γ)q2i − bqi ∑
j 6=i
qj + λβqi
n
∑
j=1
aij fijqj − ζdi
= (a− c¯)qi − νq2i − bqi ∑
j 6=i
qj + ρqi
n
∑
j=1
aij fijqj − ζdi .
We can then obtain a potential function given by
Φ(q,G) =
n
∑
i=1
((a− c¯)qi − νq2i )−
b
2
n
∑
i=1
qi ∑
j 6=i
qj +
n
∑
i=1
qi
n
∑
j=1
aij fijqj − ζm.
The stationary distribution is given by
µϑ(q,G) =
eϑΦ(q,G)
∑H∈Gn
∫
[0,q¯]n e
ϑΦ(s,H)ds
.
The probability of observing a network G ∈ Gn, given an output distribution q ∈
[0, q¯]n is determined by conditional distribution
µϑ(G|q) = ∏
i<j
eϑaij(ρ fijqiqj−ζ)
1+ eϑ(ρ fijqiqj−ζ)
, (57)
which is equivalent to the probability of observing an inhomogeneous random graph
with link probability
pij =
eϑ(ρ fijqiqj−ζ)
1+ eϑ(ρ fijqiqj−ζ)
. (58)
Note that an inhomogeneous random graph with a link probability similar to the one
in Equation (58) has been analyzed in Boguna et al. [2004]. The authors show that if
the technology levels are drawn from a multivariate uniform distribution a number
of network characteristics can be computed which closely reproduce the empirically
observed patterns of R&D networks.
3.4. Endogenous Networks with Heterogeneous Marginal Costs
We consider ex ante heterogeneity among firms in the variable cost c¯i ≥ 0 [see also
Banerjee and Duflo, 2005], expressing their different technological and organizational
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capabilities.16 The marginal cost of production of firm i ∈ N is then given by
ci(e,G) = c¯i − αei − β
n
∑
j=1
aijej, (59)
where ei ∈ [0, e¯i] and α, β ∈ [0, 1]. Requiring that ci ≥ 0 we must have that c¯i ≥
∑
n
j=1 ej = ne¯ for all i = 1, . . . , n. Hence, c¯i isO(n). Similarly, as in the previous sections,
the first-order conditions for efforts imply that ei = max{ α2γqi, e¯i}. The non-negativity
of marginal cost in the case of an interior equilibrium then requires that qi ≤ 2γα e¯i for
all i = 1, . . . , n. We further assume that a > max1≤i≤n{c¯i}. We denote by λ = α2γ .
Profits of firm i from Equation (8) then become
pii = (a− c¯i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
nηi
qi − b
n
∑
j 6=i
qiqj + αqiei + β
n
∑
j=1
aijqiej − γe2i − ζdi . (60)
Using the fact that in the interior equilibrium ei = λqi, we can write firm i’s profit as
pii = nηiqi − νq2i − bqi ∑
j 6=i
qj + ρqi
n
∑
j=1
aijqj − ζdi .
We first compute the equilibrium quantities for a given network G. The FOC can
be written as
∂pii
∂qi
= nηi − 2νqi − b∑
j 6=i
qj + ρ
n
∑
j=1
aijqj = nηi − (2ν− b)qi − b‖q‖+ ρ
n
∑
j=1
aijqj = 0.
Let  ≡ (η1, . . . , ηn)⊤. Then in vector-matrix notation this is
n = ((2ν − b)In − ρA)q+ bu‖q‖.
Denoting by ¯ ≡ n2ν−b , φ ≡ ρ2ν−b and κ ≡ b2ν−b this is
q = (I− φA)−1(¯− κ‖q‖)u.
Following Calvo´-Armengol et al. [2009] we define the µ-weighted Bonacich centrality
16Blundell et al. [1995] argued that because the main source of unobserved heterogeneity in models
of innovation lies in the different knowledge stocks with which firms enter a sample, a variable that
approximates the build-up of firm knowledge at the time of entering the sample is a particularly good
control for unobserved heterogeneity.
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as
b¯(G, φ) = (In − φA)−1¯ =
∞
∑
k=0
φkAk¯, (61)
where suitable conditions have to be imposed on the vector µ, the parameter φ and
the eigenvalue λPF(G). The Bonacich centrality is then simply given by b(G, φ) =
bu(G, φ). Then we can write
q = b¯(G, φ)− κ‖q‖bu(G, φ).
Multiplying from the left with u⊤ gives
u⊤q = ‖q‖ = ‖b¯(G, φ)‖ − ν‖q‖‖bu(G, φ)‖.
from which we get
‖q‖ = ‖b¯(G, φ)‖
1+ κ‖bu(G, φ)‖ .
It follows that equilibrium quantity can be written as
q = b¯(G, φ)− κ‖b¯(G, φ)‖
1+ κ‖bu(G, φ)‖bu(G, φ).
Note that theHamiltonian in the partition functionZϑ =
∫
[0,q¯1]
∫
[0,q¯2]
· · · ∫[0,q¯n] eϑH (q)dq
in the case of heterogeneous marginal costs is given by
H (q) =
n
∑
i=1
(
nηiqi − νq2i + ∑
j>i
(
1
ϑ
ln
(
1+ eϑ(ρqiqj−ζ)
)
− bqiqj
))
.
When ϑ → ∞ we can write
lim
ϑ→∞
H (q) =
n
∑
i=1
(
nηiqi − νq2i + ∑
j>i
(
ρqiqj − ζ
)
1{ρqiqj>ζ}− bqiqj
)
.
From the maximization of this expression we find that if the capacity constraints q¯i
are binding, then the stochastically stable state will be a threshold graph (nested split
graph) in which a link ij is present if and only if q¯(i)q¯(j) >
ζ
ρ and quantities are given by
the ordered vector (q¯(1), q¯(2), . . . , q¯(k), 0, . . . , 0) where k = max{1 ≤ j ≤ n : q¯(1) q¯(j) >
ζ
ρ}. In the case of finite ϑ we obtain a generalized threshold graph as they have been
studied in Bogun˜a´ and Pastor-Satorras [2003]; Diaconis et al. [2008]; Ide et al. [2010,
2009]; So¨derberg [2002].
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4. Efficiency
For a given network G, social welfareW(G) is given by the sum of consumer surplus
and firms’ profits. When firms compete in a homogeneous product oligopoly then
social welfare is given by [Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez, 2001]17
W(q,G) =
1
2
(
n
∑
i=1
qi
)2
+
n
∑
i=1
pii(q,G)
=
1
2
(
n
∑
i=1
qi
)2
+
n
∑
i=1
(
ηqi − νq2i − b∑
j 6=i
qiqj + ρqi
n
∑
j=1
aijqiqj
)
− 2ζm. (62)
Note that welfareW(q,G) is related to the potential Φ(q,G) as follows
W(q,G) =
1
2
(
n
∑
i=1
qi
)2
−
n
∑
i=1
qi(η − νqi) + 2Φ(q,G). (63)
Hence, the states maximizing the potential Φ(q,G) are not necessarily identical to
the ones maximizing welfareW(q,G). However, the only network dependent part in
W(q,G) is the potential function Φ(q,G). For a given vector of outputs q the network
that maximizes the potential is the threshold graph G where each link ij ∈ G if and
only if ρqiqj > ζ. Hence, we can write welfare reduced to this class of networks as
follows
W(q) = η
n
∑
i=1
qi +
1− 2b
2
(
n
∑
i=1
qi
)2
− (ν− b)
n
∑
i=1
q2i +
n
∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
(ρqiqj − ζ)1{ρqiqj>ζ}.
From the form of W(q) we see that we can distinguish two types of firms: those that
are connected, and those that are not. Let N1 denote the set of the first, and N2 the set
of the latter. The FOC for i ∈ N1 is given by
∂W(q)
∂qi
= η + (1− 2b)(n1q1 + n2q2)− 2(ν− b)q1 + 2ρ(n1 − 1)q1 = 0,
17In the empirical paper by Ko¨nig et al. [2011] this welfare analysis is extended to account for R&D
subsidies. Moreover, the authors characterize the firms that are most critical in terms of their contribu-
tion to the aggregate productivity of the economy.
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network q1 q2
empty graph q1 = q2 = 0 q1 = q2 = 0
dominant group q1 > 0 q2 = 0
dominant group q1 > 0 q2 > 0
complete graph q1 = q2 > 0 q1 = q2 > 0
Table 1: Summary of efficient networks and quantities.
while the FOC for i ∈ N2 is
∂W(q)
∂qi
= η + (1− 2b)(n1q1 + n2q2)− 2(ν− b)q2 = 0.
The FOCs for all firms in the same set are identical, so their quantities must be identical
too. We denote by q1 the optimal quantity level of the firms in N1 and by q2 the optimal
quantity level of the firms in N2. Moreover, let n1 = |N1| and n2 = |N2| = n− n1. For
0 ≤ q1, q2 ≤ q¯ we then we have that
q1(n1, n2) =
η(b− ν)
(b− ν)(2(ν − b) + n(2b− 1)) + (n1 − 1)(2(ν − b) + (2b− 1)n2)ρ ,
q2(n1, n2) =
η(b− ν + (n1 − 1)ρ)
(b− ν)(2(ν − b) + n(2b− 1)) + (n1 − 1)(2(ν − b) + (2b− 1)n2)ρ , (64)
and welfare can be written as as a function of 0 ≤ n1 ≤ n (since n2 = n− n1) as follows
W(n1, n2(n1)) = η(n1q1 + n2q2) +
1− 2b
2
(n1q1 + n2q2)
2
− (ν − b)(n1q21 + n2q22) + n1(n1 − 1)(ρq21 − ζ). (65)
The above discussion can be summarized in the following proposition (see also Table
1).
Proposition 8. The efficient network G∗ maximizing welfare is either (i) the empty network,
(ii) the complete network, or (iii) has the dominant group architecture. The optimal quantities
q∗ = (q1, . . . , q2, . . .) are given by Equation (64) subject to 0 ≤ q1, q2 ≤ q¯, where the optimal
size n1 of the dominant group maximizes Equation (65) and n2 = n− n1.
In the following we discuss two special cases. First, for q2 = 0 we find that
W(q1) = ηn1q1 +
1− 2b
2
n21q
2
1 − (ν− b)n21q21 + n1(n1 − 1)(ρq21 − ζ),
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Figure 5: (Left panel) The optimal size n1 solving Equation (66) when q2 = 0 with ρ = 0.3 and ν = 0.8.
(Right panel) The optimal size n1 for ζ = 0 from Equation (67) with ρ = 0.4, ν = 0.5 and η =
√
10n.
and from the FOC
∂W(q1)
∂n1
= 0 we obtain
q1 =
η
(2(ν − ρ)− 1)n1 + 2ρ .
Inserting into welfare gives
W(n1) =
n1
2
(
η2
2ρ + (2(ν − ρ)− 1)n1 − 2(n1 − 1)ζ
)
.
We take n1 as a continuous variable, so that the FOC ofW(n1)with respect to n1 leads
us to the condition
η2ρ
(2ρ + (2(ν − ρ)− 1)n1)2 = (n1 − 1)ζ. (66)
The optimal size n1 solving this equality is illustrated in Figure 5. Next, for ζ = 0 we
obtain
W(n1) =
η2(((b− ν)n+ (n− n1)(n1 − 1)ρ
2(b− ν)(2b(n − 1)− n+ 2ν) + 2(n1 − 1)(2b(n − n1 − 1)− n− n1 + 2ν)ρ .
Note that in this case q2 = 0. From the FOC
∂W(q1)
∂n1
= 0 we get
n1 =
1
ρ
(
ρ + ν− b+
√
(ν− b)(ν − b+ ρ)
)
. (67)
The optimal size n1 for ζ = 0 is illustrated in Figure 5.
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5. Future Work
Two important avenues are left for future work. First, it would be interesting to study
entry and exit dynamics in the current framework. It has been argued that entry and
exit play an important role in shaping the distribution of firm sizes [Acemoglu and Cao,
2010; Luttmer, 2007]. A promising approach seems to be a union of the model pro-
posed in this paper and the one in Garlaschelli et al. [2007]. Second, it would be in-
teresting to analyze the dynamics of technological change and convergence and their
relation with firm and network dynamics in the current model. Such an extension
could shed light on the coevolution of R&D networks and the knowledge portfolios
of firms Ko¨nig and Montanari [2011]. Finally, an empirical application of the model to
real-world R&D networks could help to shed light on the often significant differences
between sectors and, in particular, why the biotech sector has witnessed a steady in-
crease in the number of collaborations while other sectors have experienced a less
sustained development.
References
Acemoglu, D. and Cao, D. (2010). Innovation by entrants and incumbents. Technical report, NBER
Working Paper No. 16411.
Ahuja, G. (2000). Collaboration networks, structural holes, and innovation: A longitudinal study. Ad-
ministrative Science Quarterly, 45:425–455.
Aliprantis, C. and Border, K. (2006). Infinite dimensional analysis: a hitchhiker’s guide. Springer Verlag.
Anderson, S., Goeree, J., and Holt, C. (1998). Rent seeking with bounded rationality: An analysis of the
all-pay auction. Journal of Political Economy, 106(4):828–853.
Anderson, S., Goeree, J., and Holt, C. (2002). The logit equilibrium: A perspective on intuitive behav-
ioral anomalies. Southern Economic Journal, pages 21–47.
Anderson, S., Goeree, J., and Holt, C. (2004). Noisy directional learning and the logit equilibrium.
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 106(3):581–602.
Axtell, R. (2001). Zipf distribution of US firm sizes. Science, 293(5536):1818.
Ballester, C., Calvo´-Armengol, A., and Zenou, Y. (2006). Who’s who in networks. wanted: The key
player. Econometrica, 74(5):1403–1417.
Banerjee, A. and Duflo, E. (2005). Growth theory through the lens of development economics. Handbook
of Economic growth, 1:473–552.
Baum, J., Cowan, R., and Jonard, N. (2009). Network-independent partner selection and the evolution
of innovation networks. UNU-MERIT working paper series; 2009-022.
Besag, J. (1974). Spatial interaction and the statistical analysis of lattice systems. Journal of the Royal
Statistical Society. Series B (Methodological), pages 192–236.
Blundell, R., Griffith, R., and Van Reenen, J. (1995). Dynamic count data models of technological inno-
vation. The Economic Journal, 105(429):333–344.
Bogun˜a´, M. and Pastor-Satorras, R. (2003). Class of correlated random networks with hidden variables.
Physical Review E, 68(3):036112.
Boguna, M., Pastor-Satorras, R., Diaz-Guilera, A., and Arenas, A. (2004). Models of social networks
based on social distance attachment. Physical Review E, (70):056122.
Bolloba´s, B., Riordan, O., Spencer, J., and Tusna´dy, G. (2001). The degree sequence of a scale-free random
graph process. Random Structures and Algorithms, 18(3):279–290.
Bonacich, P. (1987). Power and centrality: A family of measures. American Journal of Sociology, 92(5):1170.
Boyd, S. and Vandenberghe, L. (2004). Convex Optimization. Cambridge University Press.
Bramoulle´, Y., Kranton, R., and D’Amours, M. (2010). Strategic interaction and networks. Cahiers de
recherche 10–18, CIRPEE.
31
Cabrales, A., Calvo´-Armengol, A., and Zenou, Y. (2010). Social interactions and spillovers. Games and
Economic Behavior.
Caldarelli, G., Capocci, A., De Los Rios, P., and Mun˜oz, M. A. (2002). Scale-free networks from varying
vertex intrinsic fitness. Physical Review Letters, 89(25):258702.
Calvo´-Armengol, A., Patacchini, E., and Zenou, Y. (2009). Peer effects and social networks in education.
Review of Economic Studies, 76:1239–1267.
Cohen, W. and Klepper, S. (1996a). A reprise of size and R & D. The Economic Journal, 106(437):925–951.
Cohen, W. and Klepper, S. (1996b). Firm size and the nature of innovation within industries: the case of
process and product R&D. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 78(2):232–243.
Corchon, L. C. and Mas-Colell, A. (1996). On the stability of best reply and gradient systems with
applications to imperfectly competitive models. Economics Letters, 51(1):59 – 65.
Cowan, R. and Jonard, N. (2008). If the alliance fits...: Innovation and network dynamics. Network
Strategy: Advances in Strategic Management, 25.
Cowan, R. and Jonard, N. (2009). Knowledge portfolios and the organization of innovation networks.
The Academy of Management Review ARCHIVE, 34(2):320–342.
D’Aspremont, C. and Jacquemin, A. (1988). Cooperative and noncooperative R&D in duopoly with
spillovers. The American Economic Review, 78(5):1133–1137.
Diaconis, P., Holmes, S., and Janson, S. (2008). Threshold graph limits and random threshold graphs.
Internet Mathematics, 5(3):267–320.
Gabaix, X. (1999). Zipf’s Law For Cities: An Explanation. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(3):739–767.
Garlaschelli, D., Capocci, A., and Caldarelli, G. (2007). Self-organised network evolution coupled to
extremal dynamics. Nature Physics, 3:813–817.
Gay, B. and Dousset, B. (2005). Innovation and network structural dynamics: Study of the alliance
network of a major sector of the biotechnology industry. Research Policy, pages 1457–1475.
Goyal, S. and Joshi, S. (2003). Networks of collaboration in oligopoly. Games and Economic Behavior,
43(1):57–85.
Goyal, S. and Joshi, S. (2006). Unequal connections. International Journal of Game Theory, 34(3):319–349.
Goyal, S. and Moraga-Gonzalez, J. L. (2001). R&D networks. RAND Journal of Economics, 32(4):686–707.
Growiec, J., Pammolli, F., Riccaboni, M., and Stanley, H. (2008). On the size distribution of business
firms. Economics Letters, 98(2):207–212.
Hagedoorn, J. (2002). Inter-firm R&D partnerships: an overview of major trends and patterns since
1960. Research Policy, 31(4):477–492.
Ide, Y. and Konno, N. (2007). Limit theorems for some statistics of a generalized threshold network
model. Theory of Biomathematics and its Applications III, 1551:81–86.
Ide, Y., Konno, N., and Masuda, N. (2010). Statistical properties of a generalized threshold network
model. Methodology and Computing in Applied Probability, 12(3):361–377.
Ide, Y., Konno, N., and Obata, N. (2009). Spectral properties of the threshold network model. Internet
Mathematics, 6(2):173–187.
Jonard, N., Cowan, R., and Sanditov, B. (2009). Fits and Misfits: Technological Matching and R & D
Networks.
Kamien, M. I., Muller, E., and Zang, I. (1992). Research joint ventures and R&D cartels. The American
Economic Review, 82(5):1293–1306.
Kandori, M., Mailath, G., and Rob, R. (1993). Learning, mutation, and long run equilibria in games.
Econometrica, pages 29–56.
Kolaczyk, E. (2009). Statistical Analysis of Network Data: Methods and Models. Springer.
Ko¨nig, M. D., Liu, X., and Zenou, Y. (2011). Policy implications for R&D alliance networks. Working
Paper.
Ko¨nig, M. D. and Montanari, A. (2011). Technology cycles in dynamic R&D networks. Working Paper.
Lee, G., Tam, N., and Yen, N. (2005). Quadratic programming and affine variational inequalities: a qualitative
study. Springer Verlag.
Luttmer, E. (2007). Selection, Growth, and the Size Distribution of Firms. The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 122(3):1103–1144.
Mattsson, L. and Weibull, J. (2002). Probabilistic choice and procedurally bounded rationality. Games
and Economic Behavior, 41(1):61–78.
Mele, A. (2010). Segregation in Social Networks: Theory, Estimation and Policy. NET Institute Working
Paper 10-16.
Monderer, D. and Shapley, L. (1996). Potential Games. Games and Economic Behavior, 14(1):124–143.
Mu¨ller, M., Cowan, R., Duysters, G., and Jonard, N. (2009). Knowledge Structures. Working Papers of
BETA.
Park, J. and Newman, M. (2004). Statistical mechanics of networks. Physical Review E, 70(6):66117.
Powell, W., Koput, K. W., and Smith-Doerr, L. (1996). Interorganizational collaboration and the locus of
32
innovation: Networks of learning in biotechnology. Administrative Science Quarterly, 41(1):116–145.
Powell, W. W., White, D. R., Koput, K. W., and Owen-Smith, J. (2005). Network dynamics and field
evolution: The growth of interorganizational collaboration in the life sciences. American Journal of
Sociology, 110(4):1132–1205.
Riccaboni, M. and Pammolli, F. (2002). On firm growth in networks. Research Policy, 31(8-9):1405–1416.
Roijakkers, N. and Hagedoorn, J. (2006). Inter-firm R&D partnering in pharmaceutical biotechnology
since 1975: Trends, patterns, and networks. Research Policy, 35(3):431–446.
Rue, H. andHeld, L. (2005). GaussianMarkov random fields: theory and applications, volume 104. Chapman
& Hall.
Sandholm, W. (2010). Population games and evolutionary dynamics. MIT Press.
Singh, N. and Vives, X. (1984). Price and quantity competition in a differentiated duopoly. The RAND
Journal of Economics, 15(4):546–554.
Snijders, T. (2001). The Statistical Evaluation of Social Network Dynamics. Sociological Methodology,
31(1):361–395.
So¨derberg, B. (2002). General formalism for inhomogeneous random graphs. Physical Review E,
66(6):066121.
Stanley, M., Amaral, L., Buldyrev, S., Havlin, S., Leschhorn, H., Maass, P., Salinger, M., and Stanley, H.
(1996). Scaling behaviour in the growth of companies. Nature, 379(6568):804–806.
Van Der Hofstad, R. (2009). Random graphs and complex networks.
Weibull, J. (1997). Evolutionary game theory. The MIT press.
Westbrock, B. (2010). Natural concentration in industrial research collaboration. The RAND Journal of
Economics, 41(2):351–371.
Wong, R. (2001). Asymptotic approximations of integrals, volume 34. Society for Industrial Mathematics.
33
